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Unsettled Law: Social-Movement Conflict, Stare
Decisis, and Roe v. Wade
MARY ZIEGLER
With President Donald Trump’s third Supreme Court nomination, the
reexamination of Roe v. Wade has become a probability. An increasingly
conservative Court will almost certainly not embrace the idea of abortion rights.
Instead, the fate of abortion rights will likely turn on the meaning of stare decisis, a
doctrine requiring the Court to pay some deference to its past decisions. Stare
decisis has recently played a starring role in abortion jurisprudence. In his
controlling concurrence in June Medical Services L.L.C. v. Russo, Chief Justice
Roberts invoked stare decisis while gutting the substantive rule written into the
precedent to which he proclaimed fidelity. This use of precedent might appear
contradictory or even hypocritical. In truth, it emanates from decades of
social-movement conflict about what defines a precedent—and what it means for a
court to be bound by past decisions.
This Article chronicles the surprising history of that conflict. Struggles over
stare decisis and abortion produced a separation of stare decisis rhetoric from any
obligation to adhere to precedent, a willingness to treat a decision’s divisiveness as
a sign of its failings, and a conflation of one or more stare decisis factors with
others. The result is a vision of stare decisis that is opaque, if not outright dishonest.
This obfuscation is particularly troubling in the context of abortion jurisprudence,
where popular constitutional engagement is intense. The Court has never been more
than one participant in a broader dialogue about reproduction and the Constitution.
If the Justices reverse Roe, they have a duty to do so in a way that facilitates, rather
than undermines, public engagement.
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Unsettled Law: Social-Movement Conflict, Stare
Decisis, and Roe v. Wade
MARY ZIEGLER *
INTRODUCTION
With the Supreme Court seemingly poised to overturn Roe v. Wade,1
social movements’ effects on constitutional law in the United States have
rarely been clearer. 2 Social movements offer substantive reasons for courts
to revisit earlier decisions like Roe.3 But the fate of Roe may depend on a
quite different brand of social-movement politics—one centered on the very
meaning of stare decisis. This Article analyzes the surprising social-movement
history of debates about how courts, lawmakers, and the people should relate to
and value judicial precedent, debates very much anchored to the fate of legal
abortion in the United States.4 These debates were on full display during the
confirmation hearings of Amy Coney Barrett, when partisans battled about
whether Roe counted as settled law (and what counted as settled in the first
place).5 But well before Justice Barrett’s confirmation, the Court made debates
about stare decisis central to its abortion jurisprudence.6 In his controlling
*

Mary Ziegler is the Stearns, Weaver, Miller Professor at Florida State University College of Law.
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2
See generally Douglas NeJaime, Constitutional Change, Courts, and Social Movements, 111
MICH. L. REV. 877 (2013) (exploring scholarly literature on how social movements change the law);
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional Law in the
Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062 (2002) (exploring social movement arguments later woven
into constitutional law); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and
Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373 (2007) (offering a case study of how social movement
arguments have influenced abortion doctrine); Reva B. Siegel, Text in Contest: Gender and the
Constitution from a Social Movement Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 297 (2001) (studying the effects
of social movement mobilization on sex equality doctrine).
3
See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: Identity-Based Social Movements and Public Law, 150
U. PA. L. REV. 419, 519–20 (2001).
4
See generally June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020), rev’g June Med. Servs.
L.L.C. v. Gee, 905 F.3d 787 (5th Cir. 2018).
5
On debates about stare decisis during the Barrett hearings, see Brian Naylor, Barrett Says She
Does Not Consider Roe v. Wade ‘Super-Precedent’, NPR (Oct. 13, 2020, 3:55 PM), https://www.npr.org
/sections/live-amy-coney-barrett-supreme-court-confirmation/2020/10/13/923355142/barrett-says-abort
ion-rights-decision-not-a-super-precedent; Jemima McEvoy, Amy Coney Barrett Says Roe v. Wade Is
Not ‘Super-Precedent’, FORBES (Oct. 13, 2020, 3:27 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jemimamcevoy/2
020/10/13/amy-coney-barrett-says-roe-v-wade-is-not-super-precedent/?sh=4da527fe61f0. See also Amy
Coney Barrett, Precedent and Jurisprudential Disagreement, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1711, 1714–15, 1722–26,
1728–30 (2013) (developing the concept of super-precedent and explaining its application to Roe).
6
See June Med. Servs., 140 S. Ct. at 2133 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (exploring the role of
precedent in Roberts’ deciding vote in the case).
1
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concurrence in June Medical Services L.L.C. v. Russo, Chief Justice Roberts
invoked stare decisis while gutting the substantive rule written into the
precedent to which he proclaimed fidelity.7 This use of precedent might
appear contradictory or even hypocritical. In truth, it emanates from decades
of social-movement conflict about what defines a precedent—and what it
means for a court to be bound by past decisions.
At first, June Medical seems to be a case about woman-protective
abortion regulations, not stare decisis.8 Louisiana had passed a law requiring
doctors to have admitting privileges at a hospital within thirty miles.9 The state
argued that the requirement would improve continuity of care for patients.10
Louisiana also argued that abortion providers should no longer have
third-party standing.11 The state identified what it saw as a dangerous conflict
of interest between patients, who would benefit from stricter safety standards,
and supposedly profit-oriented providers trying to shirk safety requirements.12
Chief Justice Roberts’s controlling concurrence, together with the
dissenting opinions, put the meaning of precedent at the heart of the case.13
Roberts would have liked to uphold Louisiana’s law.14 Nevertheless, because
of stare decisis, he felt compelled to “treat like cases alike” and struck down
the admitting-privilege requirement.15 The dissenting Justices responded with
their own accounts of what made a precedent deserving of deference.16
What are we to make of the fact that the Court dedicated so much time
to discussing stare decisis in a decision that neither preserves precedent
intact nor cleanly overrules it? Or that a Supreme Court nominee, chosen
and widely expected to vote against Roe, made so much of precedent in her
confirmation proceedings? The recent history of social-movement
7

Id. at 2134–39 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
Cf. Reva B. Siegel, The New Politics of Abortion: An Equality Analysis of Woman-Protective
Abortion Restrictions, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 991, 993 (explaining that the antiabortion movement has
“produced a woman-protective antiabortion argument that mixes new ideas about women’s rights with
some very old ideas about women’s roles”).
9
LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:1061.10(A)(2)(a) (2021).
10
Brief for Respondent/Cross-Petitioner at 85–86, June Med. Servs., 140 S. Ct. 2103 (Nos. 18-1323
& 18-1460).
11
Id. at 23–26.
12
Id. at 41–46.
13
See June Med. Servs., 140 S. Ct. at 2134 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (noting that stare decisis is
“necessary” in the judicial system, that “[r]espect for precedent” has “pragmatic benefits,” and, that under
Court precedents, Louisiana’s law cannot stand); id. at 2147, 2151–52 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Even
under the Chief Justice’s approach to stare decisis, continued adherence to these precedents cannot be
justified.”).
14
See id. at 2133 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (stating that Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt,
136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016), was “wrongly decided” though noting that the Court must adhere to its
precedent).
15
Id. at 2141–42.
16
See id. at 2149–53 (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 2157–58, 2170–71 (Alito, J., dissenting); id. at
2180–81 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
8
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mobilization over abortion helps make sense of these apparent
contradictions. Social movements have encouraged the Court to pay lip
service to stare decisis while proposing ever narrower definitions of the core
principles defining a precedent.17 Social movements have also proposed
criteria that disqualify an earlier decision as a binding precedent. Beyond the
quality of a decision’s reasoning, antiabortion lawyers in organizations like
Americans United for Life and National Right to Life Committee have
redefined “settled law,” arguing that any opinion that failed to resolve a deep
social divide—or that exacerbated existing polarization—should be
overturned.18 Both modes of reasoning about precedent allow the Court to
destabilize existing doctrine while professing respect for stare decisis.
This Article traces the surprising history of social-movement conflict
about stare decisis and abortion. It illuminates one of the ways that a
Supreme Court concerned with its legacy may unravel abortion rights
without triggering the same kind of public reaction we might expect from a
direct overruling. But this history has consequences outside of the abortion
context. The emptying out of certain liberties is especially troubling in a
constitutional system that still nominally treats rights as trumps.19
“Lowering the stakes of politics” is one of the overriding goals of judicial
review in a pluralist democracy.20 But when courts hollow rights, they “sap[]
the losing side in constitutional disputes of the leverage to deliberate toward
political consensus.”21 And by leaving some vestige of a right in place,
courts incentivize parties to rely on litigation to preserve whatever is left,
rather than to pursue more productive strategies.
By separating the rhetoric of precedent and the doctrine of stare decisis,
the Court also undermines the very values stare decisis is supposed to serve.
Invoking precedent while transforming it does not promote stability or
predictability. It involves obfuscation, resulting in a vision of stare decisis
that is opaque, if not outright dishonest.
The stakes of this obfuscation run higher in the abortion context, where
popular constitutional engagement is commonplace. The Court has never
been more than one participant in a broader dialogue about abortion and the
Constitution—a dialogue that has produced hundreds of bills, endless
political campaigns, and countless popular essays. If the Justices elect to
reverse Roe, they have a duty to do so in a way that facilitates, rather than

17

See infra Part I.
See infra Part III.A.
19
See Jamal Greene, The Supreme Court 2017 Term, Foreword: Rights as Trumps?, 132 HARV. L.
REV. 28, 32–38 (2018) (offering a framework for understanding rights as trumps).
20
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Pluralism and Distrust: How Courts Can Support Democracy by
Lowering the Stakes of Politics, 114 YALE L.J. 1279, 1293–94 (2005).
21
Greene, supra note 19, at 37.
18
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obstructs, popular responses. Without a more principled approach to stare
decisis, the Court will fail this test.
The Article proceeds in four parts. Focusing on the years before Planned
Parenthood v. Casey,22 Part I traces the origins of the constitutional politics
of precedent in the abortion conflict. Part II explores how these ideas
changed in the decades after Casey as antiabortion groups proposed
ever-narrower definitions of a constitutional right to abortion. Part III
situates June Medical and its aftermath in these ongoing constitutional
struggles and explores the costs of creating a freestanding rhetoric of respect
for precedent. Part IV briefly concludes.
I. ANTI-PRECEDENT, EMPTY PRECEDENT, 1973–1992
At present, the fate of legal abortion seems likely to turn less on the
substance of a right to choose than on the meaning of precedent.23 The
Supreme Court has six Justices selected by presidents who opposed legal
abortion or vowed to nominate only those who would vote to overturn Roe.24
Perhaps unsurprisingly, few expect the Court’s conservative majority to
accept arguments about the merits of abortion rights.25 Instead, the social
movements contesting the abortion wars are now fighting about what defines
settled law—and whether reversing Roe would run contrary to the norms
guiding stare decisis.26 In June Medical, pro-choice attorneys focused almost
exclusively on the importance of precedent and the potential damage that the
Court could do by ignoring it.27 But social-movement conflict about stare
decisis did not begin recently.
This Part traces the origin of that conflict in the 1970s. At first, abortion
foes insisted that the Court should immediately discard Roe because it
violated paramount constitutional principles.28 Antiabortion leaders quickly
recognized that their pleas had fallen on deaf ears. For a time, abortion foes
had tried to pass a constitutional amendment that would outlaw abortion
22

Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
See Melissa Murray, Symposium: Party of Five? Setting the Table for Roe v. Wade, SCOTUSBLOG
(July 24, 2019, 3:18 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/07/symposium-party-of-five-setting-the-tablefor-roe-v-wade/ (exploring the likely role for stare decisis in the fate of abortion rights).
24
See Mary Ziegler, What’s Next for Abortion Law?, BOS. REV. (Sept. 1, 2020),
http://bostonreview.net/politics-law-justice/mary-ziegler-whats-next-abortion-law (surveying the political
and legal factors pointing toward the dismantling of abortion rights).
25
See The Editorial Board, John Roberts Is No Pro-Choice Hero, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/29/opinion/supreme-court-abortion.html.
26
See Mary Ziegler, Taming Unworkability Doctrine: Rethinking Stare Decisis, 50 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
1215, 1217–39 (2018) [hereinafter Ziegler, Taming Unworkability Doctrine] (offering a history of social
movement struggles over stare decisis norms in the abortion context).
27
See Brief for Petitioners at 17–21, 26–37, June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103
(2020) (No. 18-1323) (emphasizing stare decisis principles in asking the Court to strike a Louisiana
admitting privileges requirement).
28
See infra Part I.A.
23
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29

nationwide. But the amendment failed to progress, and antiabortion leaders
instead looked for a way to work within the confines of stare decisis—to
claim respect for precedent while carving out more room for lawmakers to
restrict abortion.30 Beginning in the early 1980s, antiabortion lawyers
separated the idea of a right to make abortion decisions, which the movement
would leave untouched for the moment, from the ability to access abortion.31
The antiabortion movement appealed to the Court to pay lip service to the
idea of precedent and the importance of a right to abortion while partially
overruling Roe.32
When many expected a reconfigured Court to overturn Roe, antiabortion
lawyers developed a parallel strategy to argue that Roe’s real-world effects
made it undeserving of deference.33 In a last-ditch attempt to save Roe,
abortion-rights supporters urged the Court to save Roe because of the
practical effects of reversal, particularly the potential jeopardy to other
constitutional liberties, from the right to use contraception to the right to
marry.34 Antiabortion lawyers responded with their own arguments about
the effects of Roe, insisting that Roe was not settled because it had failed to
resolve political fractures surrounding abortion—and it made the nation’s
political polarization even worse.35
In Casey, the Court rejected a longstanding campaign to undo Roe.36
Yet, in a way, antiabortion efforts were a success. The Casey Court
discussed the importance of precedent a great deal but substantially revised
what the right to abortion meant.37 Earlier in the 1980s, antiabortion
attorneys had asked the Court to separate the ability to make a decision from
the ability to have an abortion.38 The Casey decision did just that.39
A. From Natural Law to Narrow Precedent
When antiabortion attorneys litigated Roe v. Wade, they believed that
precedent was on their side. Lawyers for the United States Catholic
Conference, Americans United for Life (AUL), and other antiabortion
groups emphasized what they saw as the recognition of fetal personhood in
29

See infra Part I.A.
See infra Part I.A.
31
See infra Part I.B.
32
See infra Part I.B.
33
See infra Part I.D.
34
See infra Part I.D.
35
See infra Part I.D.
36
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 83334 (1992).
37
See id. at 852–53 (stressing the importance of precedent while jettisoning the trimester framework
applied in Roe).
38
See infra text accompanying note 215.
39
See Casey, 505 U.S. at 851–53, 857–60, 877 (“What is at stake is the woman’s right to make the
ultimate decision, not a right to be insulated from all others in doing so.”).
30
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other areas of the law, from wrongful death to intestacy. Antiabortion
litigators also argued that, as a matter of original intent, a fetus or unborn
child counted as a rights-holding person for the purposes of the Eighth,
Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments.41 More ambitiously, some antiabortion
lawyers asked the Court to hold that the Constitution mandated the
recognition of fetal personhood and functionally prohibited any state from
allowing abortion.42 Joseph Witherspoon, a professor at the University of
Texas at Austin, made this argument on behalf of a Texas diocese of the
Roman Catholic Church. Witherspoon asserted that “the unborn child,
however unwanted or considered to be a burden by its parents, has a
constitutionally protected right to life.”43
Witherspoon understood the principles of early antiabortion
constitutionalism. He and other antiabortion attorneys and academics
appealed to a right to life not spelled out in the text or history of the
Constitution.44 The foundational text for antiabortion lawyers was not so
much the Fourteenth Amendment or Bill of Rights as it was the Declaration
of Independence. 45 AUL’s declaration of purpose represented one version of
this constitutional argument: “We believe, in the words of the Declaration
of Independence, that ‘all men are created equal’; and thus that to be true to
its heritage, this nation must guarantee to the least and most disadvantaged
among us an equal share in the right to life.”46
But precedent did have a role to play in pre-Roe antiabortion
constitutionalism, especially because so many of the movement’s arguments
turned on the recognition of fetal personhood. For example, Thomas Shaffer,
a professor at Notre Dame, argued that legal abortion deprived the fetus of life
without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.47 “If
human life is involved, though, [in abortion],” Shaffer explained, “its
40
See MARY ZIEGLER, AFTER ROE: THE LOST HISTORY OF THE ABORTION DEBATE 27–57 (2015)
[hereinafter ZIEGLER, AFTER ROE] (exploring strategies used to bolster the case for personhood by
recognizing fetal rights in other areas of law).
41
See Motion for Leave to Submit a Brief Amicus Curiae: Brief of Women for the Unborn as Amici
Curiae in Support of Appellees at 9–10, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (No. 70-18) (stressing
arguments about personhood); Brief of Americans United for Life, Amicus Curiae, in Support of
Appellee at 5–10, Roe, 410 U.S. 113 (No. 70-18) (arguing the same); Motion for Leave to File Brief a
Brief as Amicus Curiae & Brief of Amicus Curiae Robert L. Sassone In Support of Respondent at 5–8,
Roe, 410 U.S. 113 (No. 70-18) (arguing the same).
42
See Mary Ziegler, Originalism Talk: A Legal History, 2014 BYU L. REV. 869, 887 (2014)
[hereinafter Ziegler, Originalism Talk] (referencing the AUL’s declaration of purpose); see also infra
text accompanying note 46.
43
Brief Amicus Curiae on Behalf of Association of Texas Diocesan Attorneys, in Support of
Appellee at 3, Roe, 410 U.S. 113 (No. 70-18).
44
See Ziegler, Originalism Talk, supra note 42, at 896.
45
See id. at 874, 887, 896, 921 (demonstrating that activists “argue[d] for the existence of a
fundamental right to life” through the Declaration of Independence).
46
Id. at 887 (quoting AUL’s Declaration of Purpose).
47
Thomas L. Shaffer, Abortion, the Law and Human Life, 2 VAL. U. L. REV. 94, 106 (1967).
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destruction is a relatively grave matter. Abortion should at least, in that case, be
surrounded with procedural protections as great as those given men convicted
of crime . . . .”48 Shaffer framed personhood as a question of biology.49
Other antiabortion attorneys, however, recognized that personhood
could be a term of art in the law, regardless of how convincing they found
biological evidence on the subject.50 Antiabortion attorneys like Shaffer
dealt with this issue by insisting that precedent increasingly looked to
biology to define who counted as a person. David Louisell, a professor at the
University of California Berkeley, made this argument for fetal
personhood.51 “The progress of the law in recognition of the fetus as a human
person for all purposes has been strong and steady and roughly proportional
to the growth of knowledge of biology and embryology,” Louisell argued in
the late 1960s.52
Nevertheless, precedent played only a small part in a strategy that relied
on substantive due process and human rights.53 Professor Robert Byrn
summarized these arguments as follows:
The Declaration of Independence holds as self-evident the
moral truths “that all men are created equal, that they are
endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable Rights, that
among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”
The fourteenth amendment institutionalized these principles . . .
in the Constitution.54
At first, Roe v. Wade only hardened the antiabortion movement’s
conviction that precedent supported the idea of fetal personhood.55 Roe
addressed the constitutionality of a Texas law criminalizing most
abortions,56 while its companion case, Doe v. Bolton, struck down a version
of a common reform bill first promoted by the American Law Institute.57
The results of Roe and Doe invalidated the abortion laws then on the books
in forty-six states.58
The Roe majority positioned the right to abortion as a logical extension
of existing precedents on child-rearing, marriage, procreation, and family
48

Id.
See id.
50
See Ziegler, Originalism Talk, supra note 42, at 883–97.
51
David W. Louisell, Abortion, the Practice of Medicine and the Due Process of Law, 16 UCLA
L. REV. 233, 234 (1969).
52
Id.
53
See Ziegler, Originalism Talk, supra note 42, at 883–97.
54
Robert M. Byrn, Abortion-on-Demand: Whose Morality, 46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 5, 19 (1970).
55
See ZIEGLER, AFTER ROE, supra note 40, at 38–57.
56
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 117–19 (1973).
57
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 182–84 (1973).
58
Richard H. Pildes, Is the Supreme Court a “Majoritarian” Institution?, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 103,
150–51.
49

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

466

[Vol. 54:2

59

relationships. Rather than accepting the argument that precedent required
the recognition of fetal personhood, the Court treated personhood as a
textual question.60 Justice Harry Blackmun’s majority looked to the uses of
“person” elsewhere in the Constitution and suggested that many, if not all,
uses applied only after birth.61
The Court also rejected a related argument about the government’s
interest in protecting fetal life.62 Texas had justified its criminal abortion law
by identifying a compelling interest in protecting life from the moment of
fertilization.63 The Court declined to “resolve the difficult question of when
life begins.”64 Nevertheless, from the standpoint of social movement
conflict, the Court did take sides on what defined personhood, leaving the
matter to individual patients rather than allowing the state to impose its
preference. 65 Roe even dismissed the idea that biology established a clear
definition of personhood.66 A biological definition fell apart in the face of
“new embryological data that purport to indicate that conception is a
‘process’ . . . rather than an event, and by new medical techniques such as
menstrual extraction [and] the ‘morning-after’ pill . . . .”67 Roe treated
personhood as a matter of individual conscience, not as a question already
settled by precedent.68
For a time, Roe only deepened the antiabortion movement’s
commitment to the politics of personhood.69 In part, antiabortion lawyers did
not bother to respond to Roe’s holding because the movement’s primary goal
was a constitutional amendment that would make the 1973 decision
irrelevant.70 As early as 1974, Congress already had several constitutional
amendments under consideration, either recognizing fetal personhood or
establishing a right to life.71 But the antiabortion movement also argued that
Roe did not qualify as the kind of precedent to which the Court should

59

Roe, 410 U.S. at 152–53.
Id. at 156–59.
61
Id.
62
Id. at 159–64.
63
Id. at 159.
64
Id.
65
See id. at 159–64.
66
Id. at 156–58, 160–62.
67
Id. at 161.
68
See id. at 160–62.
69
See ZIEGLER, AFTER ROE, supra note 40, at 41–45 (exploring the campaign for a fetal personhood
amendment that unfolded in the aftermath of Roe).
70
See Keith Cassidy, The Right to Life Movement: Sources, Development, and Strategies, in THE
POLITICS OF ABORTION AND BIRTH CONTROL IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 128, 144 (Donald T.
Critchlow ed., 1996) (describing the details of a Human Life Amendment that would criminalize all
abortions, except in cases in which a woman’s life was threatened).
71
See NAT’L COMM. FOR A HUM. LIFE AMEND., HUMAN LIFE AMENDMENTS: MAJOR TEXTS 1, 3,
6 (2004), https://www.humanlifeaction.org/downloads/sites/default/files/HLAmajortexts.pdf.
60
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72

defer. As antiabortion lawyers framed it, the Roe majority had ignored
everything from natural law to the real meaning of substantive due process.73
These arguments defined antiabortion constitutionalism in the first
major post-Roe abortion case, Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v.
Danforth.74 Danforth involved several incremental restrictions, from a
written consent requirement to a law mandating parental consultation.75
AUL submitted a brief that pressed many of the arguments that had defined
antiabortion advocacy before 1973.76 The group asked the Court to set aside
its usual respect for precedent because Roe conflicted with both natural law
and earlier precedent on fetal personhood:
John Locke, whose influence on the thinking of the founders of
this nation is well known, wrote in his Second Treatise of Civil
Government of the natural rights to life and property. These
basic ideas found their way into the Declaration of
Independence of July 4, 1776 . . . . In speaking of the first official
action of this nation, which declared the foundation of our
government in those words, the United States Supreme Court has
said that “. . . it is always safe to read the letter of the
constitution in the spirit of the Declaration of Independence.”
. . . [T]he importance of the right to life in modern political and
social theory has remained nearly unscathed as is evidenced not
only by the Fourth Article of The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, . . . but also by the Second Article of the
European Human Rights Convention, and the movement to
abolish capital punishment.77
The United States Catholic Conference likewise argued that Roe did not
deserve deference because it had not followed the principles of substantive
due process developed in earlier cases like Griswold v. Connecticut78 and
Eisenstadt v. Baird:79
The granting of legal personhood . . . is, we submit, properly
the product of a constitutional analysis which recognizes the
existence of rights which must be said to be implicit in other,
more explicitly protected rights. . . . The process used to reach
72

See supra notes 40–54.
See supra notes 49–54; see also infra text accompanying notes 77–80.
74
428 U.S. 52, 58, 82–83 (1976).
75
Id. at 58–59.
76
Motion & Brief, Amicus Curiae of Dr. Eugene Diamond & Americans United for Life, Inc., in
Support of Appellees in 74-1151 & Appellants in 74-1419 at 35–36, Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (Nos. 741151 & 74-1419).
77
Id. (footnotes omitted).
78
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
79
405 U.S. 438 (1972).
73
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the penumbral rights enunciated in Griswold v. Connecticut is
the self-same recognition of necessary implication. . . . There
is irony in the fact that the majority in Roe not only failed to
use the penumbral process with respect to fetal life, but also
misapplied it with respect to the pregnant woman.80
The lead-up to Danforth suggested that the antiabortion movement would
stick to its earlier constitutional approach, regardless of what the Supreme
Court said.81 Ironically, however, the decision of Danforth and a second case,
Maher v. Roe,82 planted the seeds of a new approach to precedent.
Maher involved a Connecticut regulation banning Medicaid
reimbursement for elective abortions.83 The lower courts had struck down the
regulation.84 In particular, the trial court held that, by choosing to fund
childbirth but not abortion, the state had violated the Equal Protection
Clause.85 In appealing to the Supreme Court, Connecticut did not set out to
reconfigure the Court’s approach to precedent.86 Nevertheless, Connecticut’s
approach in Maher illuminated a new way to grapple with Roe.87
Connecticut argued for a separation between the right to make a decision
and the ability to act on that decision.88 “There is nothing in the Connecticut
regulation which prevents a woman from making a choice to have an
abortion,” Connecticut argued in its brief before the Supreme Court.89 “Of
course, once that choice has been made, if the woman is indigent, she must
now look for a source of funds with which to pay the cost of the abortion.”90
As the government saw it, poverty had nothing to do with the government’s
actions.91 Roe framed abortion as a matter of privacy, freedom from
government interference.92 As AUL argued in its brief in Poelker v. Doe,93
a companion case, “If the abortion decision is so private . . . it follows that
80
Brief of Amicus Curiae for U.S. Catholic Conference at 16–18, Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (Nos. 741151 & 74-1419) (footnotes omitted).
81
See supra text accompanying notes 40–73.
82
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), rev’g sub nom. Roe v. Norton, 408 F. Supp. 660 (D. Conn.
1975) (Norton III).
83
Maher, 432 U.S. at 466–67.
84
See Roe v. Norton, 380 F. Supp. 726 (D. Conn. 1974) (Norton I), rev’d 522 F.2d 928 (2d Cir.
1975) (Norton II), remanded to 408 F. Supp. 660 (D. Conn. 1975) (Norton III), rev’d sub nom. Maher
v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
85
See Norton I, 380 F. Supp. at 730. See also Norton II, 522 F.2d at 930.
86
Brief of the Appellant at 4–9, Maher, 432 U.S. 464 (No. 75-1440).
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See Maher, 432 U.S. at 47180.
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Brief of the Appellant, supra note 86, at 13–16.
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Id. at 14.
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Id.
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See id. at 15–17.
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See id. at 13–14 (noting that Roe v. Wade “enunciated” women’s constitutional right of personal
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government should not itself be compelled to respond to the demand of the
exercise of that private right.”94 Maher suggested the outlines of a new
approach to precedent. Rather than asking the Justices to reject Roe
altogether, antiabortion lawyers could propose narrower and narrower
understandings of Roe’s essential holding.95 In Connecticut’s view, all that
mattered was whether patients could make decisions about abortion;96
whether anyone could actually end a pregnancy was beside the point.97
The decisions in Danforth and Maher suggested that redefining Roe
might be a smart strategy. In Danforth, the Court invalidated most of the
disputed Missouri statute but upheld one measure requiring a woman to give
written consent before receiving an abortion.98 Danforth suggested that the
Court might narrow abortion rights while still recognizing Roe as a
precedent. 99 Maher reinforced this impression. The Court upheld the
disputed Connecticut regulation, reasoning that Roe had recognized only a
right to make “certain kinds of important decisions free from governmental
compulsion.”100 As a result, abortion restrictions violated the Constitution
only if they involved “unduly burdensome interference with [a woman’s]
freedom to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy.”101 The state had not
made women poor and therefore had not created any undue burden.102
The antiabortion movement argued that Roe had no precedential value
because it conflicted with natural law. But Danforth and Maher suggested
that the movement would get further by contesting how much a court could
reinterpret or even overturn a precedent without appearing indifferent to
stare decisis. Antiabortion lawyers experimented with this approach,
drafting an ordinance designed to serve as a model for states and cities across
the nation.103 The centerpiece of the law was an informed-consent measure
that went considerably further than the one in Danforth, forcing patients to
hear contested statements about the connection between abortion and
everything from depression to infertility.104 Akron, Ohio, a small, Rust Belt
94
Motion & Brief, Amicus Curiae of Americans United for Life, Inc. in Support of Petitioner John
H. Poelker at 13, Poelker, 432 U.S. 519 (No. 75-442).
95
See supra Parts I.A–B.
96
See supra notes 8689 and accompanying text.
97
See supra notes 8690 and accompanying text.
98
Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67 (1976).
99
See id. at 65–67.
100
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 47374 (1977) (internal quotation marks omitted).
101
Id.
102
See id. at 474 (“The indigency that may make it difficult—and in some cases, perhaps,
impossible—for some women to have abortions is neither created nor in any way affected by the
Connecticut regulation.”).
103
See MARY ZIEGLER, ABORTION AND THE LAW IN AMERICA: ROE V. WADE TO THE PRESENT 60–
63 (2020) [hereinafter ZIEGLER, ABORTION AND THE LAW IN AMERICA] (detailing the history and
strategic importance of the Akron ordinance).
104
See id. at 6061.
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105

city, became the first to pass the ordinance. Within three years, the
Supreme Court agreed to hear a constitutional challenge to the law.106
B. The Rhetoric of Precedent
By the time the Supreme Court agreed to hear City of Akron v. Akron
Center for Reproductive Health (Akron I),107 the antiabortion
movement’s constitutional strategy had changed substantially. The
constitutional-amendment campaign, the hallmark of post-Roe advocacy,
had flamed out.108 Even after antiabortion Republicans appeared to control
the White House and both houses of Congress, abortion foes lacked the votes
to pass the kind of absolute ban the movement favored, and the movement
remained too divided over what would be the best alternative to get anything
done.109 As important, President Ronald Reagan, the first president to
strongly oppose abortion since the decision of Roe, had put his first new
Justice on the Supreme Court.110 There was no love lost between the
antiabortion movement and Sandra Day O’Connor, a former Arizona state
legislator and judge.111 Carolyn Gerster, then the president of the National
Right to Life Committee (NRLC), the nation’s largest antiabortion group,
believed that Judge O’Connor supported abortion rights and had worked to
scuttle any restrictions during her time in the Arizona State Legislature.112
The antiabortion movement found itself in a quandary: the only way to undo
abortion rights was to convince the Supreme Court to overturn Roe, but few
Justices, even President Reagan’s nominee, seemed willing to ignore the
principles of stare decisis.
That the Court would not overturn Roe seemed to be a given. But, the
City of Akron argued that the Court could respect Roe’s central holding
while upholding the disputed ordinance.113 In service of this approach, the
City argued that Roe stood for a right to make a decision about abortion and
nothing more.114 Meanwhile, Akron reasoned that the trimester framework,
105
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See id. at 6364.
107
462 U.S. 416 (1983) (Akron I).
108
See ZIEGLER, ABORTION AND THE LAW IN AMERICA, supra note 103, at 67.
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See id.
110
See, e.g., Patrick Buchanan, Reagan Letter Fuel for ‘Pro-Lifers’, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 15, 1981, at
W7 (detailing abortion foes’ opposition to Justice O’Connor); Arthur Siddon, Abortion Foes Rap Court
Nominee, CHI. TRIB., July 10, 1981, at A2 (detailing the same).
111
See Buchanan, supra note 110, at W7.
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See id. (reporting that Gerster and Judge O’Connor were “longtime acquaintances” and that
President Reagan, in nominating Judge O’Connor to the bench, “had betrayed the Right-to-Life
movement”).
113
See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 5–6, City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc.,
462 U.S. 416 (1983) (Akron I) (No. 81-746) (arguing that the Court’s abortion jurisprudence only invalidated
“unduly burdensome” laws, while validating laws, like the Akron ordinance, that helped women).
114
Id.
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the rule that actually governed access to abortion, had no precedential value.115
Indeed, Akron argued that Maher and Danforth had already eliminated the
unimportant parts of Roe and adopted a brand-new doctrinal rule.116
Roe held that the state could not regulate abortion in the first trimester
of pregnancy.117 Akron insisted that Roe instead protected only the right to
make a decision.118 That meant that the state could impose any regulation
that aided patients in making a decision or did not take away that power.119
So long as the state claimed to help patients, the state could “strike[] a
reasonable balance between the woman’s protected right [of privacy] and
the state’s interest in maternal health” and ensure the informed consent of
the patient.120
AUL defined Roe’s core holding even more narrowly. Roe defined
patients’ liberty “not as a right to abortion, but as a right to choose.”121 That
meant the state could pass laws that “influence a woman to carry her child
to term, laws which impact on physicians who provide abortions, laws which
assure the medical consultation without which the liberty does not exist, or
laws protective of the fetus or of other state interests.”122 Even if the Court
did find that a regulation directly affected women’s choice, the state could
still introduce any law that “benefit[ted]” patients or created an
“insubstantial” burden, so long as that burden was not “undue.”123 Under
AUL’s understanding of Roe’s essential holding, the Texas law the Court
had struck down—which criminalized all abortions unless a patient’s life
was at risk—might still be unconstitutional.124 Virtually any other abortion
restriction would likely pass muster.125
It was not unusual to argue for an exceedingly narrow interpretation of
a past decision. But, antiabortion attorneys expected the Court to signal its
fidelity to precedent all while rolling back concrete protection for abortion.
The idea was to create a rhetoric of precedent that functioned independently
from substantive doctrine. The rhetoric might seem like a strange objective
for a movement ultimately focused on criminalizing all abortions, but Roe
was an unusually well-recognized and hotly contested decision. Regardless
of what a judge thought about the merits of Roe, she might be worried that
115
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overturning it would cause a backlash. Paying lip service to precedent might
make the Court more comfortable narrowing or partially overturning Roe.
C. Akron I and Its Aftermath
In Akron I, the antiabortion movement’s gambit failed—or at least it
seemed that way. The Court struck down every part of the disputed Akron
law, even the informed consent provision in which abortion opponents had
invested so much.126 The Court also rejected attempts to create a new rhetoric
of precedent. The majority acknowledged that “[c]ertain regulations that have
no significant impact on the woman’s exercise of her right may be permissible
where justified by important state health objectives.”127 But, the Court
reinterpreted its decisions in Maher and Danforth as strictly prohibiting any
regulation that interfered “with physician-patient consultation or with the
woman’s choice between abortion and childbirth.”128
Nor did the Court accept that there was a bright line between decisions
about abortion and access to the procedure.129 Consider the Court’s analysis of
Akron’s requirement that all second-trimester abortions take place in a
hospital.130 The state had argued that the requirement would protect patients’
health because the risks of abortion increased later in pregnancy.131 In
invalidating the law, the Court stressed the burdens on access that the law would
produce.132 Akron I reasoned that the requirement would heavily limit access
both because hospital abortions were much more expensive and because few
Akron hospitals would perform them.133 Laws that created “financial expense
and additional health risk” could be unconstitutionally burdensome, even if
patients retained the power to make a decision about abortion.134
But Akron I was not a total loss for abortion opponents looking to forge
a new approach to precedent. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s dissent
claimed there was a way to preserve Roe while undoing the trimester
framework.135 In Justice O’Connor’s view, Roe’s central holding was
simple: “the right to privacy [was] broad enough to encompass a woman’s
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”136 The trimester
126

Akron I, 462 U.S. at 452.
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framework, by contrast, could be discarded without showing any fundamental
disrespect for precedent: “Even assuming that there is a fundamental right to
terminate pregnancy in some situations, there is no justification in law or logic
for the trimester framework adopted in Roe,” she wrote.137
Justice O’Connor’s opinion, together with the ongoing failure of an
antiabortion constitutional amendment, convinced the antiabortion movement
to focus on overturning Roe rather than amending the Constitution.138 With
the right people on the Court, the Justices might be willing to reverse Roe or
even recognize a right to life.139
As Republican presidents remade the Supreme Court, the antiabortion
movement developed a different approach to the rhetoric of precedent.
Antiabortion lawyers focused less on what the Constitution said about a right
to abortion or a right to life and instead primarily developed arguments about
what defined a precedent deserving of respect. If a precedent did social,
economic, and political damage, that weighed in favor of overruling. Such
was supposedly the case with Roe.
D. Precedent Disqualification
As soon as the Court seemed poised to overturn Roe, abortion-rights
groups increasingly relied on stare decisis rather than arguing the substantive
merits of abortion rights themselves.140 Assuming that the Justices would
reject arguments for abortion, pro-choice attorneys spotlighted what they
described as the collateral effects of reversing Roe.141 This strategy had
unintended effects. Antiabortion attorneys then suggested that the
consequences of Roe made it uniquely “unsettled.”142 Instead of resolving
conflict about abortion, Roe supposedly deepened polarization around the
issue, perverted judicial nominations, and damaged national politics.143
Antiabortion lawyers insisted more broadly that, from the standpoint of stare
decisis, real-world consequences could disqualify a precedent.144
The need for a new strategy to preserve abortion seemed evident by
1989, when the Supreme Court seemed poised to reconsider its opinions on
137
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abortion. Notwithstanding the failed nomination of Robert Bork,
President Reagan placed two new Justices on the Supreme Court.145 The
Court also appeared to have a majority willing to revisit Roe.146 When the
Justices agreed to hear a challenge to a multi-restriction Missouri law,
abortion-rights attorneys recognized that the Court’s new conservative
majority did not put much stock in constitutional justifications for
abortion rights.147 Instead, abortion-rights attorneys relied on stare
decisis to sway wavering Justices.148 Representing the appellees in
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, Planned Parenthood attorneys
Roger K. Evans, Dara Klassel, and their colleagues argued that there was
no justification for the Court to take the “radical step” of overturning
precedent.149 Amici bolstered this argument. The National Organization
for Women, a feminist group, emphasized that “stare decisis should be
given strict adherence where individual rights are at stake.”150
Amici argued that Roe deserved special deference because of its
real-world consequences. 151 The Supreme Court had recently, repeatedly,
and strongly reaffirmed Roe.152 As a result, many would view the reversal of
Roe as a response to “popular pressure,”153 and Planned Parenthood
attorneys reasoned that undoing Roe would put other fundamental liberties
in jeopardy.154 The Roe Court had based its holding partly on other privacy
decisions, including those involving contraception, marriage, and
parenting.155 If the Court would undo one such right, Planned Parenthood
warned that others might fall soon.156
Antiabortion amici responded that Roe’s real-world effects proved that
the Court had not only failed to settle the abortion issue but had also done
145
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157

real political and social damage.
Several antiabortion members of
Congress asserted that stare decisis principles primarily served to promote
consistency and predictability in the law.158 These members of Congress
maintained that Roe had “caused great instability and unpredictability in the
law.”159 But the problems with Roe’s consequences were not merely
doctrinal. The brief insisted that stare decisis did not require respect for
precedents that had failed to settle a social dispute.160 “[A] popular rejection
of the abortion right”—reflected by ongoing state efforts to restrict
abortion—suggested that Roe had failed to settle the abortion debate once
and for all.161 As important, if Roe continued to deepen polarization, that
meant that the state of the law remained unstable and uncertain,162 which did
nothing to serve the values of stare decisis.163
Missouri tried to separate the rhetoric of respect for precedent from any
obligation to leave the trimester framework alone.164 The state argued that
the Court could uphold the Missouri statute without overturning anything.165
What the state requested was “not the ‘abolition’ of a constitutional right but
rather a modification of the standard of review.”166 Stare decisis required the
Court to preserve the core holding of a decision.167 Missouri insisted that
nothing in stare decisis stopped the Court from strengthening, modifying, or
improving its own precedent.168 In the case of Roe, rejecting the trimester
framework would “bring [the Court’s] rulings in line with the general
requirement that state regulations affecting a liberty interest protected by the
due process clause need only be procedurally fair and bear a rational relation
to valid state objectives.”169
In Webster, the Court upheld all of the disputed Missouri law, including
a statutory preamble recognizing fetal personhood, a measure preventing the
use of public facilities for abortion, and a provision that required a physician
to perform certain tests to determine fetal viability.170 The Court spent the
157
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most time on the viability provision, recognizing that, under Roe, the law
might be held to unconstitutionally interfere with a physician’s discretion
when it came to abortion.171 A plurality picked up on Missouri’s argument that
the Court could jettison the trimester framework without overturning Roe or
offending the principles of stare decisis.172 Webster described Roe’s central
holding as “a Texas statute which criminalized all nontherapeutic abortions
unconstitutionally infringed the right to an abortion.”173 The trimester
framework, by contrast, was not central enough to Roe to require deference.174
And the Webster plurality insisted that the trimester framework was “hardly
consistent with the notion of a Constitution cast in general terms, as ours is,
and usually speaking in general principles.”175 While voting that the Missouri
law was constitutional, Justice O’Connor did not join the plurality, insisting
that Roe allowed for Missouri’s viability determination.176
Webster made it seem as if the antiabortion movement’s rhetoric on
precedent was already having an effect. The Court seemed willing to give the
states more or less free rein to regulate abortion, all while claiming to respect
the principles of stare decisis. In the next three years, antiabortion leaders put
more energy into arguments about what precedent meant.177 In Casey, these
efforts failed to convince the Court to reject Roe outright.178 Indeed, Casey
rhapsodized about the importance of precedent, the reliance interests that Roe
produced, and the connection between abortion and equal citizenship for
women. But, at the same time, the Court set aside the trimester framework and
replaced it with what seemed to be a far less protective standard.179 While
efforts to disqualify Roe as a valid precedent fell short, the Court increasingly
separated its rhetoric concerning precedent from its respect for the concrete
holdings of Roe and its progeny. Social-movement conflict about precedent
only grew more intense as a result.
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E. Remaking Precedent in Casey
After Webster, many expected the Supreme Court to overturn Roe.180
After a plurality had expressed doubt about its ongoing validity, Republican
President George H. W. Bush had nominated two new Justices, David Souter
and Clarence Thomas, to the Court.181 It seemed possible that the Court
would have as many as seven votes to reverse Roe. Antiabortion lawyers
rushed to pass abortion restrictions that would give the Court the opportunity
to reverse the decision. Some banned abortion at fertilization,182 and others
outlawed abortion except in cases of fetal disability, rape, incest, or certain
severe health threats to the patient.183 In Casey, the Supreme Court agreed
to hear a challenge to a more conventional set of abortion restrictions.184
Pennsylvania had introduced a law requiring, among other things, the
involvement of parents and spouses and mandatory informed consent.185 In
dealing with the law, antiabortion and abortion-rights lawyers refined their
approaches to stare decisis.
Abortion-rights attorneys fully expected the Court to overturn Roe.
Groups like the ACLU planned to capitalize on this defeat to catapult
pro-choice Democrats to success in the presidential and congressional
elections of 1992.186 Attorneys like Kathryn Kolbert and Linda J. Wharton,
the lawyers litigating Casey, fought for a bill in Congress protecting abortion
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rights if the 1992 election went the right way. But Wharton and Kolbert
made a last-ditch attempt to save Roe that leaned heavily on stare decisis.188
To some degree, the petitioners’ brief in Casey echoed arguments made
in Webster about the consequences of overturning Roe.189 Kolbert and
Wharton insisted that the consequences of withdrawing or destroying a
constitutional right would be particularly grave.190 The petitioners also
insisted that the Court could not undo Roe without putting other protected
liberties, like the right to marry or use birth control, at risk.191
The petitioners’ brief simultaneously took up arguments made by
antiabortion lawyers about when a precedent deserved deference.192
Antiabortion lawyers had insisted that Roe did not count as a valid precedent
because of its broader legal and social consequences.193 Wharton and
Kolbert agreed that the political, social, and economic consequences of a
decision were an important factor in stare decisis.194 But the petitioners
argued that Roe’s effects made the preservation of a right to choose even
more crucial.195 The petitioners insisted that Roe had “allowed millions of
women to escape the dangers of illegal abortion and forced pregnancy” and
led to “substantial decreases in the total number of abortion-related deaths
and complications.”196
Their brief identified consequences beyond the medical details of
abortion itself.197 They claimed that Roe had allowed women to “continue
their education, enter the workforce, and otherwise make meaningful
decisions consistent with their own moral choices.”198 Kolbert and Wharton
stressed that, if stare decisis turned partly on the political and social
ramifications of a decision, then Roe should be the last decision the Justices
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See Brief for Petitioners & Cross-Respondents at 19, 1922, Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (Nos. 91-744
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capitalization omitted).
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See id. at 2731, 3840.
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court-ordered abortion).
192
See id. at 1722.
193
See infra text accompanying notes 194–196.
194
See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
195
See Brief for Petitioners & Cross-Respondents, supra note 188, at 3134 (arguing that “Roe’s
guarantee of safe, legal abortion has been of profound importance to the lives, health, and equality of
American women”) (internal capitalization omitted).
196
Id. at 31–32.
197
Id. at 31–34.
198
Id. at 33.

UNSETTLED LAW

2022]

479

199

overruled. “[W]omen have experienced significant economic and social
gains since Roe,” Kolbert and Wharton argued.200
Antiabortion briefs described this view of Roe’s consequences as
incomplete, if not outright wrong. The United States Catholic Conference
asserted that Roe had undermined the legitimacy of the Court’s privacy
doctrine and damaged relationships between both spouses and parents and
children.201 The National Right to Life Committee (NRLC) contended that
Roe had warped virtually every area of the law, from tort rules to homicide
law to the standards applied to injunctive relief.202
Pennsylvania, by contrast, invited the Court to divorce the rhetoric of
precedent from the substance.203 The state argued that Roe had never
embraced “abortion on demand” but had, in fact, only ruled out a small
subset of restrictions very unlike the ones that Pennsylvania adopted.204 The
state maintained that Roe had recognized a right to make decisions about
abortion that could be reasonably regulated.205 Pennsylvania paid lip service
to precedent but insisted that the trimester framework was not a central part
of Roe.206
The Casey plurality defied expectations by declining an invitation to
overturn Roe.207 Moreover, in detailing the reasons for preserving an abortion
right, Casey echoed the petitioners’ arguments about the broader—and
beneficial—consequences of precedent.208 Consider Casey’s analysis of
reliance interests. Often, the Court hesitated to overturn a precedent that
would upend contracts or business arrangements that required advanced
planning.209 But, in the traditional sense, abortion generated no reliance
interests; patients who sought abortions typically did not plan to become
pregnant, much less in advance.210
In its analysis of reliance, Casey intervened in social-movement debates
about whether the real-world effects of a decision should factor into stare
decisis. “[F]or two decades of economic and social developments, people
have organized intimate relationships and made choices that define their
199
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views of themselves and their places in society, in reliance on the availability
of abortion in the event that contraception should fail,” Casey reasoned.211
“The ability of women to participate equally in the economic and social life
of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive
lives.”212 It seemed that antiabortion arguments about the consequences of
precedent had backfired.
The plurality also picked up on arguments that reversing Roe would
undermine the Court’s legitimacy because many would interpret that decision
as a response to political pressure.213 But all of this talk about precedent seemed
disconnected from the reality of what Casey had done. The plurality adopted a
longstanding antiabortion interpretation of Roe’s essential holding.214 As early
as Maher v. Roe, antiabortion lawyers had separated the right to make decisions
about pregnancy—a holding that had some precedential value—from any
doctrinal rule guaranteeing access to abortion.215
Casey adopted a similar interpretation.216 Much as abortion foes had
long argued, the plurality described that essential holding as involving not
access but “the right of the woman to choose to have an abortion before
viability.”217 In addition to downplaying access, the Court also directly
contradicted parts of Roe’s original holding.218 Roe held that the
government’s interest in protecting fetal life began only after fetal
viability.219 Casey described as one of Roe’s essential holdings that the State
had “legitimate interests from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting the
health of the woman and the life of the fetus.”220
Casey’s modifications of Roe went much further. The plurality rejected
the trimester framework—arguably the centerpiece of Roe—by concluding
that it was not central to the 1973 decision.221 “The trimester framework
suffers from these basic flaws: in its formulation it misconceives the nature
of the pregnant woman’s interest; and in practice it undervalues the State’s
interest in potential life,” the plurality reasoned.222 Casey’s rhetoric of
precedent underlined the importance of Roe and made a compelling case for
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how Roe had changed the broader society. At the same time, the plurality
undid the part of Roe that actually protected abortion the most.224
Casey launched a new round of social-movement politics around
precedent. Antiabortion leaders insisted that many of the plurality’s factual
conclusions about the benefits of abortion were wrong. But they also looked
to Casey for new inspiration, particularly seeking more ways to weave in
arguments on the negative consequences of abortion to conventional stare
decisis norms, such as unworkability and reliance. More than ever, the fate
of legal abortion became intertwined with the politics of precedent.
II.PRECEDENT POLITICS AFTER CASEY
While Casey disappointed antiabortion attorneys,225 the plurality
decision sparked new ideas about stare decisis. For decades, abortion
opponents had urged the Court to separate the rhetoric of stare decisis from
a substantive willingness to rewrite doctrinal rules and dump the trimester
framework.226 When the Casey Court accepted this invitation, antiabortion
leaders used that fact as proof that Roe and Casey were both unworkable.227
Antiabortion lawyers argued that, if the Court had to modify or change a
precedent, precedent could not be settled law.228
The war over a specific procedure known as partial-birth abortion
deepened social-movement conflicts over precedent.229 In 2000, the Court
struck down a state partial-birth abortion ban in Stenberg v. Carhart.230 But
Republicans gained control of the Senate, and George W. Bush won the race
for the White House, making possible the passage of a federal ban.231 In
Gonzales v. Carhart, the Court took up the constitutionality of a federal
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act.232 While abortion-rights lawyers insisted
that Stenberg required adherence to precedent, antiabortion leaders insisted
that precedents did not deserve deference if they stood in tension with related
case law, generated inconsistent results, or failed to settle political
controversy.233 These arguments paid off in Gonzales, but the antiabortion
movement had a reversal of fortunes in Whole Woman’s Health v.
Hellerstedt, a 2016 case that struck down two Texas laws claimed to protect
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234

women from the dangers of abortion. Whole Woman’s Health helped to
crystallize antiabortion arguments about precedent. Groups like AUL and
NRLC argued that Whole Woman’s Health did not deserve respect as a
matter of stare decisis because of the real-world damage it did, the
inconsistent results it produced, and the controversy it inspired.235
These arguments shaped a fresh challenge in June Medical. Ironically,
however, Chief Justice Roberts, who cast the deciding vote in June Medical,
fell back on an earlier social-movement argument about precedent, one that
had played a defining role in Casey itself.236 Chief Justice Roberts discussed
the value of precedent at great length while overturning the central holding of
Whole Woman’s Health.237 In June Medical, Chief Justice Roberts, at least,
suggested that respect for precedent demanded very little from the Court.238
A. Casey as an Argument for Overruling
Casey did not slow down social-movement debates about the meaning
of precedent. Instead, attorneys working for AUL tried to make Casey a key
piece of evidence that Roe and its progeny did not qualify as the kind of
precedent that deserved deference.239 In a 1992 strategy memo, AUL
attorney Clarke Forsythe argued that the Court’s willingness to rework Roe
proved that it was unworkable.240 In this analysis, Casey itself helped to
prove that Roe should not be saved.241 “Roe has been ‘workable’ only when
the Court has abandoned various aspects of Roe to uphold abortion
regulations,” AUL insisted.242 Of course, antiabortion lawyers had asked the
Court to rework Roe on more than one occasion.243 But, as antiabortion
lawyers framed it, the fact that the Court had modified a precedent became
a sign of unworkability.244
AUL also tried to redefine what counted as “settled precedent.”
Antiabortion lawyers suggested that no precedent could be settled if it
234
See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2300 (2016) (concluding that each
Texas law “places a substantial obstacle in the path of women seeking a previability abortion, each
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citations omitted). See also infra Part II.C.
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FORSYTHE, AMS. UNITED FOR LIFE, AUL BRIEFING MEMO: THE GOOD NEWS ABOUT PLANNED
PARENTHOOD V. CASEY (1992)).
240
Id. (chronicling AUL’s strategy around workability “centered on the idea that Casey struck the
wrong balance between fetal rights and abortion autonomy”).
241
Id.
242
Id.
243
Id. at 1218.
244
Id.

2022]

UNSETTLED LAW

483

245

remained politically controversial. This, too, could be a self-fulfilling
prophecy. Antiabortion scholars and activists could ensure that controversy
over abortion did not die out.246 The group also insisted that Roe and Casey
were unworkable because they were wrong—and, in particular, because they
did not achieve the task the Court had set for itself: finding “a way as to give
real meaning to both the state’s interests and the woman’s interests that Roe
itself created.”247 The more the Court conflated erroneous decisions with
precedents that had bad effects, the easier it might be to convince the Court
to revisit its earlier decisions on abortion.248
At first, however, leading antiabortion attorneys mostly sought to build
on the model Casey had created by promoting informed-consent laws.249
Some expanded on the ideas in Casey, often including controversial claims
about the health risks of abortion.250 These statutes obviously served to limit
access to abortion.251 But antiabortion lawyers also hoped to show that the
benefits of legal abortion described by the Casey Court were illusory.252
Notwithstanding the reasoning of the Casey Court, AUL insisted that Roe
and Casey “undermine secure, independent, and healthy lives for American
women.”253 Proving that abortion undermined women’s health would make
a stronger case that neither Roe nor Casey counted as valid precedents.254
Questions about the health effects of abortion took center stage in 1994
after Republicans gained control of the House of Representatives for the first
time in decades.255 NRLC moved to pass a ban on dilation and extraction, a
procedure that the group called partial-birth abortion.256 Dilation and
245
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extraction, a relatively rare procedure, involved one pass through the uterus,
rather than several passes, and therefore might have minimized the risks of
injury to the woman.257 Antiabortion leaders found the procedure deeply
disturbing and argued that it bore a striking resemblance to infanticide.258
From the beginning, fights about dilation and extraction turned on the need
for a health exception.259 Abortion providers and abortion-rights groups
insisted that, under certain circumstances, dilation and extraction would best
protect a patient’s health or fertility.260 Antiabortion lawyers responded that
evidence on the matter was uncertain—and that, in the face of scientific
uncertainty, lawmakers should have more freedom to act.261
In Stenberg v. Carhart, the Court concluded first that the state’s
definition of partial-birth abortion was impermissibly vague.262 As a result,
Nebraska’s definition likely applied not only to dilation and extraction but
also to dilation and evacuation, the most common procedure after the first
trimester.263 The Court likewise held that Nebraska’s law constituted an
undue burden under Casey.264
The majority suggested that the need for dilation and extraction was
uncertain.265 But this uncertainty militated in favor of recognizing an
exception. “Where a significant body of medical opinion believes a procedure
may bring with it greater safety for some patients and explains the medical
reasons supporting that view, we cannot say that the presence of a different
view by itself proves the contrary,” the Court reasoned.266 “Rather, the
uncertainty means a significant likelihood that those who believe that D&X is
a safer abortion method in certain circumstances may turn out to be right.”267
In his dissent, by contrast, Justice Antonin Scalia picked up on
antiabortion arguments that a precedent could not be settled so long as it
257
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produced political divisions. He described Casey as unworkable because
it was vague, open to interpretation, and “ultimately standardless.”269 But
Scalia’s understanding of settled law was broader. He mocked anyone who
would “persist in the belief that this Court, armed with neither constitutional
text nor accepted tradition, [could] resolve that contention and controversy
rather than be consumed by it.”270 Far from settling the abortion conflict,
Roe and Casey had triggered a “firestorm of criticism.”271 And because
neither one had settled the abortion controversy, Scalia argued that both
should be overturned.272
Scalia’s dissent energized abortion foes who hoped to build on Stenberg,
the majority decision notwithstanding. Under this definition, the mere existence
of the antiabortion movement—and the fact of its partnership—could prove that
Roe and its progeny were not settled. The political abortion wars, in turn, could
serve as an excuse for a Court looking to overturn Roe.
B. Partial-Birth Abortion and the Politics of Precedent
Because antiabortion leaders still saw partial-birth abortion as a winning
strategy, Stenberg kick-started the social-movement politics of precedent.
Polls suggested that most Americans supported a ban on the procedure.273
As important, groups like NRLC believed that more Americans identified as
pro-life the more debate focused on partial-birth abortion rather than on
other restrictions.274 Reviving a federal ban seemed crucial to the success of
antiabortion politicians and activists.275 With President George W. Bush in
office, passing a law also seemed possible.276 President Bush signed the
federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act into law in 2003, and challenges in
federal court began almost immediately.277
268
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Id. at 955 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 987 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
270
Id. at 956.
271
Id.
272
See id. (“If only for the sake of its own preservation, the Court should return this matter to the
people—where the Constitution, by its silence on the subject, left it—and let them decide, State by State,
whether this practice should be allowed. Casey must be overruled.”).
273
Lydia Saad, More Americans “Pro-Life” Than “Pro-Choice” for First Time, GALLUP (May 15,
2009), http://news.gallup.com/poll/118399/more-americans-pro-life-than-pro-choice-first-time.aspx; see
also Robin Abcarian, 51% in U.S. Say They’re ‘Pro-Life’; It’s the First Gallup Poll to Find ‘Pro-Choice’
Outweighed—at 42%—and a Near-Reversal of Last Year’s Figures., L.A. TIMES, May 16, 2009, at A.20
(reporting on the apparent flip in public sentiment).
274
See ZIEGLER, ABORTION AND THE LAW IN AMERICA, supra note 103, at 187–89 (“Younger
abortion-foes might have overestimated the shift in public opinion, but for the first time, a 2009 Gallup
poll showed that a majority of Americans identified as pro-life.”).
275
Id. at 175.
276
See id. at 168.
277
See id. at 171, 176; Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-105, 117 Stat. 1201
(2003) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1531).

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

486

[Vol. 54:2

Given the Court’s recent decision in Stenberg, the fate of the federal law
would obviously turn partly on stare decisis. Attorneys for the Center for
Reproductive Rights challenging the law argued that Stenberg (and respect for
stare decisis) should decide the case.278 Stenberg was a recent decision, one
consistently applied by the lower courts.279 As the Center framed it,
Congress’s response boiled down to an argument that Stenberg was wrong,
which was not enough to disturb a precedent.280 Planned Parenthood, another
respondent in the case, echoed this argument.281 Stenberg had not “proven
unworkable in practice; doctors at leading medical institutions nationwide
ha[d] been trained to use this technique; pregnant women ha[d] benefited from
access to safer procedures; Stenberg ha[d] been applied consistently by the
lower courts; and there ha[d] been no legal or factual developments that would
undermine Stenberg’s underpinnings,” Planned Parenthood explained.282
In defending the federal law, Congress picked up on antiabortion
arguments about what made a precedent settled.283 In the wake of Casey,
AUL had insisted that any inconsistency with or modification of precedent
proved an earlier decision to be unworkable.284 In defending the Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban Act, the government flipped this argument on its head, arguing
that any later case that conflicted with or modified an earlier ruling should
be set aside.285 Congress argued that Stenberg did not deserve deference
because the decision was “unfaithful to the Court’s prior precedents,
including Casey.”286 The government also borrowed from antiabortion
arguments suggesting that any precedent that was wrong on the merits was
likely to be unworkable.287 Casey and Roe, the argument went, commanded
a balance between the government’s respect for fetal life and a woman’s
ability to end a pregnancy.288 By permitting a procedure of which the
government disapproved, Stenberg supposedly conflicted with Casey by
putting society at risk of becoming more indifferent to fetal life.289
The government elaborated on these arguments in its reply brief.290
Congress contended that Stenberg was not settled law because it was
278
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controversial—because it was “sharply criticized” by members of the Court
and politicians, because it produced “conflicting conclusions” in the lower
courts, and because it forced trial courts to do a kind of scientific fact-finding
for which judges were not qualified.291 Antiabortion amici suggested that
there could be no reliance interests on abortion either, unless a particular
technique or reason for abortion had become part of the national culture.292
“No one orders his or her life around the possibility of recourse to partial
birth abortions,” wrote Jay Alan Sekulow, the attorney representing the
American Center for Life and Justice.293
Gonzales vindicated antiabortion efforts to frame Casey—or a particularly
narrow interpretation of Casey—as true precedent (and Stenberg as an
unfortunate misunderstanding). To be sure, Justice Kennedy distinguished the
case from Stenberg.294 Kennedy reasoned that Congress had adopted a
different definition of partial-birth abortion, one that would functionally
exclude dilation and evacuation and avoid any issues with constitutional
vagueness.295 When it came to application of the undue-burden test, the Court
simply ignored Stenberg. Gonzales concluded that Congress had important
governmental interests in protecting the dignity of fetal life and preventing
women from regretting abortion.296 “While we find no reliable data to measure
the phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to conclude some women come to
regret their choice to abort the infant life they once created and sustained,”
Kennedy reasoned.297
The Court departed from Stenberg more explicitly when it came to the
issue of scientific uncertainty.298 Stenberg had concluded that the law
required a health exception if there was a real chance that patients’ health
would suffer absent access to the disputed procedure.299 Gonzales worked
around this conclusion by emphasizing that Congress had made extensive
factual findings on the need for dilation and extraction (or the lack
thereof).300 “The Court has given state and federal legislatures wide
discretion to pass legislation in areas where there is medical and scientific
uncertainty,” Kennedy reasoned.301 To get past Stenberg, Gonzales appealed

291

Id. at 20.
Amicus Brief of the American Center for Law & Justice et al. in Support of Petitioner at 12 n.11,
Gonzales, 550 U.S. 124 (No. 05-380).
293
Id.
294
Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 13233, 14145, 15154.
295
Id. at 12728, 15154.
296
Id. at 159.
297
Id.
298
See id. at 162–63; infra text accompanying notes 301–302.
299
Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 93637 (2000).
300
Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 141.
301
Id. at 163.
292

488

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:2
302

to earlier, more venerable precedents, including Casey. Kennedy framed
his opinion not as a departure from Stenberg but rather as a return to the
“traditional rule.”303
In the aftermath of Gonzales, antiabortion attorneys hoped again to be
able to functionally overrule Roe without forcing the Court to confront
precedent directly. Gonzales seemed to require considerable deference to the
findings of fact made by state and federal lawmakers, especially when a
medical question seemed scientifically uncertain.304 It would not be hard to
demonstrate such scientific uncertainty. Antiabortion organizations relied on
their own experts and sources of data and could supply uncertainty if the
courts asked for it.305
In the meantime, groups like AUL refined their unworkability arguments.
In 2010, AUL presented Roe, Doe, and Casey as “utterly unworkable” because
“legislators constantly struggle[d] to construct legislative language that
[would] pass the current ‘test’ used by the Supreme Court in abortion
jurisprudence.”306 Of course, the mere fact that the Court recognized a right to
abortion made it hard for legislators to devise restrictions that would be
constitutional. That was the point: AUL described any abortion right as
inherently unworkable.
Clarke Forsythe of AUL later described partisan polarization around
abortion as evidence that Roe and Casey were not settled—and therefore not
the kinds of precedents that “should be given ‘respect.’”307 Support for either
decision was based on “partisan bias,” Forsythe reasoned.308 Neither Roe nor
Casey had “the steady support of executive departments.”309 Forsythe
suggested that a precedent was settled and deserving of respect only if it
commanded bipartisan or even universal support.310 This was a high bar that
few precedents might clear. Even fewer precedents would satisfy this
standard if, like Roe and Casey, they touched on a divisive social issue.
Significantly, if polarization counted as a reason to discard precedent, social
movements themselves could generate evidence of a precedent’s flaws.
Framed this way, the mobilization of the antiabortion movement—and its
influence on US law and politics—counted as a reason to reconsider Roe.
302
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Forsythe’s understanding of unworkability also empowered social
movements to produce their own evidence of a precedent’s flaws.311
Forsythe identified several signs of unworkability: if a precedent had been
modified or reinterpreted, if “federal courts ha[d] constantly battled over
[its] meaning,” and if a rule failed to correct real-world injuries.312 Based on
these criteria, Forsythe readily described Roe and Casey as unworkable.313
He stressed that “Roe, as originally written, ha[d] not been affirmed and
reaffirmed; instead, it ha[d] been repeatedly changed and altered.”314 Both
Roe and Casey had produced inconsistent results in the lower courts, and the
Court remained “oblivious to what [had been] happening in clinics.”315 As
Forsythe framed it, questions about stare decisis partly turned on whether
abortion was safe, but any ambiguity or open-endedness in an original ruling
would indicate that it was unworkable, as would any sign that an issue
remained politically polarized.
Forsythe also wove political polarization into his analysis of reliance
interests.316 He stressed that Roe and Casey were not “politically settled”
because “legal, social, cultural, and political developments and trends” had
kept “Roe/Casey in flux.”317 Forsythe likewise argued that the reliance
interests identified in Casey should not be taken seriously because the
“reliance of women on abortion as an empirical matter ha[d] not been
demonstrated.”318 Polarization also suggested that any reliance interests
created by Roe and Casey were weak because “the Supreme Court has
retreated at least three times from the harshest application of Roe v. Wade.”319
Forsythe highlighted the spread of abortion restrictions to suggest that no
reasonable patient could believe that the abortion issue was settled,
particularly state laws that “treat the unborn child as a human being or person
from conception.”320 He even proposed considering whether a precedent had
politically settled a question as an independent part of stare decisis analysis.321
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C. From Whole Woman’s Health to June Medical
These ideas about stare decisis influenced the litigation of the Court’s next
major abortion case, Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt.322 Most simply,
Whole Woman’s Health involved the constitutionality of two provisions based
on an AUL model law.323 One required doctors to have admitting privileges
at a nearby hospital,324 and another mandated that abortion clinics comply with
state regulations governing ambulatory surgical centers.325 Both sides in the
case agreed that, if the laws went into effect, most abortion clinics in the state
would close.326 On the surface, Whole Woman’s Health had little to do with
the decades of social-movement conflict about precedent. The case seemed to
test the limits of a state’s power to restrict abortion in the name of protecting
patients. But, Whole Woman’s Health built on decades of antiabortion work
toward separating the rhetoric of precedent from any obligation to adhere to
past decisions. Antiabortion lawyers insisted that Casey had applied a test
similar to rational basis.327 Adhering to precedent meant recognizing a right to
make decisions about abortion, but allowing states more or less free rein to
pass any abortion restriction.328
Antiabortion lawyers cited Gonzales’s treatment of scientific uncertainty
as evidence that the undue burden test functioned much like rational basis.329
In Whole Woman’s Health, attorneys for the Center for Reproductive Rights
responded that Casey did not require blind deference to state lawmakers, even
in cases where there was a dispute about medical facts.330 Together with
abortion-rights amici, the Center contended that Casey required courts to
balance the burdens and benefits of a law and to gather concrete evidence of
each one, rather than to simply accept legislators’ own version of the facts.331
In theory, under this approach, a pointless law might violate the Constitution
if it was only somewhat burdensome.332
Antiabortion lawyers not only advocated for a more deferential
approach but also for a formal declaration that the undue burden test was
322
136 S. Ct. 2292, 2310 (2016), rev’g Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563 (5th Cir.
2015) & 790 F.3d 563 (5th Cir. 2015).
323
Id. at 2300.
324
Id. at 2300, 2310.
325
Id. at 2300, 2314.
326
See, e.g., Amicus Curiae Brief of 44 Texas Legislators in Support of Defendants-Appellants &
Reversal of the District Court at 20, Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 769 F.3d 285 (5th Cir. 2014) (No.
14-50928) [hereinafter Brief of 44 Texas Legislators] (conceding that clinics might close if the Texas
law were allowed to go into effect).
327
See id. at 4–5 (drawing a parallel between rational basis and the undue burden test).
328
See id. at 12–14.
329
See id. at 5.
330
Brief for Petitioners at 36–40, Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563 (5th Cir. 2015)
(No. 15-274).
331
Id. at 31–32, 37.
332
See id. at 34, 36–37, 47.
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333

virtually identical to rational basis. In an amicus curiae brief on behalf of
state legislators, AUL lawyers argued that, under Casey and its progeny, a
restriction was constitutional “where there is a rational basis for its
enactment and it does not pose an undue burden.”334 In a separate amicus
brief, AUL likewise argued that “[t]he first step in the analysis of an abortion
regulation . . . is rational basis review.”335 This argument served two
purposes.336 Obviously, a more relaxed standard would allow for more
abortion regulations. But by officially redefining the undue burden test,
antiabortion lawyers could drive a wider wedge between the rhetoric of
precedent and actual deference to the Court’s prior abortion decisions.
Moreover, antiabortion lawyers could use any modification in the Casey
framework as evidence of its unworkability.
Whole Woman’s Health rejected AUL’s take on the undue burden
standard.337 By a 5-3 margin, the Court reasoned that Casey required a
weighing of both the benefits and burdens of a law.338 Gonzales
notwithstanding, courts had a duty “to review factual findings where
constitutional rights are at stake.”339
The Court further clarified what it meant for a law to have no benefits.
Whole Woman’s Health reasoned that Texas’s HB2 did not deliver any
benefit partly because abortion in the state was safe and resulted in very few
complications.340 The Court also explained what constituted an actionable
burden and how one could be proven.341 Texas had stressed that other
factors, like decreasing demand for abortion, might have led to clinic
closures.342 Whole Woman’s Health credited amicus evidence and expert
testimony attributing closures to the introduction of HB2.343 Texas further
argued that HB2 would not eliminate access to abortion since a handful of
clinics would remain open.344 The Court nonetheless found that patients
333
See Brief of 44 Texas Legislators, supra note 326, at 1, 5–16 (urging the Court to clarify that
undue burden test operated the same as rational basis).
334
Amicus Curiae Brief of More than 450 Bipartisan & Bicameral State Legislators & Lieutenant
Governors in Support of the Respondents & Affirmance of the Fifth Circuit at 5, Whole Woman’s Health
v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016) (No. 15-274).
335
Brief of 44 Texas Legislators, supra note 326, at 5 (alteration in original).
336
See id. at 7 (arguing that “[a] proper analysis . . . clearly demonstrates that the State has a rational
basis to require that abortion clinics be regulated as ambulatory surgical centers and that such a
requirement does not pose an undue burden on women seeking abortions in Texas”).
337
See Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2309–18 (explaining that the undue burden did not require
uncritical deference to state legislatures).
338
Id. at 2309.
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Id. at 2310 (quoting Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 165 (2007)).
340
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would face an unconstitutional burden because of increased travel times,
expenses, and a lower quality of care.345
After Whole Woman’s Health, antiabortion attorneys once again
invested in the politics of precedent. First, following his election, President
Donald Trump placed two Justices on the Supreme Court and created what
many presumed to be a conservative majority willing to reconsider Roe.346
When President Trump replaced Justice Anthony Kennedy with Brett
Kavanaugh of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, many assumed that the
Court would reverse Roe in the near term.347 Antiabortion arguments about
stare decisis went into overdrive.348 Clarke Forsythe proposed a draft
opinion overturning Roe that drew on the precedent-based strategies that
abortion opponents had forged over the years.349 Starting with Maher and
Akron I, antiabortion attorneys had urged the Court to pay lip service to
precedent while changing the substantive rules governing abortion access.350
Those doctrinal modifications would then help make the case that Roe and
Casey should go.351 Forsythe echoed this approach. Any doctrinal
modification proved that “[t]here ha[d] never been consistency in [the]
Court’s application of Roe or Casey” and that neither one was settled.352
Indeed, he argued that the “fundamental test of an authoritative Supreme
Court decision” was whether a case had “failed to settle [an] issue.”353
Abortion foes could demonstrate that Casey and Roe were unsettled by
convincing the Republican Party to maintain its opposition to abortion or by
encouraging the passage of new abortion restrictions.354
Forsythe also proposed an expansive definition of unworkability. He
suggested that any standard that failed to produce consistent results in the
lower courts qualified as unworkable.355 That meant that virtually any
345

Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2313, 2317–18.
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(2018) [hereinafter Forsythe, Draft Opinion].
350
See supra Part I.
351
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balancing test was necessarily unworkable. “The enterprise of applying a
standard—whether undue burden or any other standard—to a public health
issue such as abortion, with all its complexity, is not suited to the federal
courts,” Forsythe wrote.356
When it came to reliance, Forsythe again stressed that there was no
empirical proof or record evidence that patients relied on abortion—or that
abortion, rather than contraception, led to advancement for women.357 He
suggested that to the extent fertility control explained women’s
advancement, it was contraception, not abortion, that had helped women
achieve equal citizenship.358 Whether patients wanted and expected to have
access to abortion was irrelevant. Instead, reliance interests applied only if
there was empirical proof that abortion access made women more equal.359
And, even if abortion were safe, patients should recognize that the issue
remained unsettled.360 Understood in this way, there could be no valid
reliance interests if a precedent did social, political, or economic damage.
And there could be no valid reliance interests if the public was on notice that
the law could change.
June Medical came as the culmination of social-movement debates about
the meaning of precedent. The Court’s decision showed just how much the
rhetoric of precedent could function separately from any real commitment to
past decisions. With an additional Supreme Court nomination, President
Trump seemingly set the Court on a certain path to reversing Roe. The politics
of precedent took on new importance. For decades, social movements had
contested what defined a valid precedent—and whether Roe and its progeny
qualified. With a reconfigured Supreme Court, the Justices seemed open to
adopting these arguments themselves.
III. JUNE MEDICAL AND THE FATE OF ROE
Observers of June Medical could be forgiven for thinking they had seen
all of this before. Louisiana passed an admitting privileges requirement
virtually identical to the one in Whole Woman’s Health.361 The state insisted
that the reality of abortion care in Louisiana differed from the Texas
experience described by the Court four years earlier.362 In particular,
Louisiana insisted that doctors in the state had not made a good faith effort
356
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to get admitting privileges and that there were real benefits to those
privileges in Louisiana.363 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed and
upheld the state law.364 After the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case,
Louisiana also asked the Justices to decide whether abortion providers had
third-party standing to bring constitutional challenges.365
The Court had recognized standing for abortion doctors in Singleton v.
Wulff in 1976.366 Louisiana insisted that Singleton got everything wrong:
abortion doctors could not be trusted to represent patients when their
interests were diametrically opposed.367
June Medical struck down the Louisiana law.368 The Court left no doubt
that it struck down Louisiana’s abortion law because of stare decisis.369
Chief Justice Roberts, who cast the deciding vote in the case, acknowledged
that he had joined the dissent in Whole Woman’s Health and still saw nothing
wrong with admitting-privilege restrictions.370 Nevertheless, because of
stare decisis, Chief Justice Roberts saw no way to distinguish Louisiana’s
law from Texas’s.371
But, understood in historical context, the uses of precedent in June
Medical are far more complex and consequential than it may first appear.
This Part begins by considering the ideas about precedent developed in
social-movement briefs in Whole Woman’s Health. Next, this Part traces
how June Medical both adopted and reworked social-movement arguments
about the meaning of precedent. Regardless of the fate of Roe, these
approaches to precedent will carry new weight as challenges to Roe pick up
momentum. But this idea of stare decisis is deeply problematic. Increasingly,
the Court has made unique—and impossible to meet—demands of
precedents in the abortion context. At the same time, the Court has forged a
powerfully opaque rhetoric of precedent that makes it hard for the public to
understand what has happened to abortion jurisprudence or to respond.
A. Defining Precedent in June Medical
Precedent was at the heart of social-movement struggle in June Medical. In
challenging the Louisiana law, the Center for Reproductive Rights said
relatively little about abortion rights, instead castigating the state for seeking “to

363
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upend settled law” and “disregard[] stare decisis at every turn.” The Center
emphasized that the Court had never upheld a law identical to one that had been
recently struck down.373 The Center further stressed that, to side with Louisiana
on standing, the Court would need to ignore decades’ worth of precedent on
both third-party standing and waiver of objection to third party standing.374
Antiabortion attorneys certainly tried advancing a narrow interpretation
of Whole Woman’s Health.375 For example, the antiabortion Susan B.
Anthony List insisted that Whole Woman’s Health was a narrow, as-applied,
and intensely factual ruling that did not foreclose any other state from
passing an admitting privileges law.376
But antiabortion attorneys also insisted that stare decisis required the
Court to retire its 2016 decision. This drew on earlier antiabortion arguments
insisting that adherence to precedent required the overturning of all or most
abortion decisions.377 The Trump administration took this approach in
insisting that Whole Woman’s Health contradicted Casey. For this reason,
the administration argued that stare decisis required the Court to overrule
Whole Woman’s Health and restore Casey’s supposedly less protective
test.378 NRLC likewise maintained that, if Casey deserved some deference,
Whole Woman’s Health certainly did not.379 The group’s brief insisted that
Whole Woman’s Health was unworkable because it had “created confusion
among lower courts” and because it was an “aberration” that departed from
“Casey’s lowered scrutiny.”380
AUL repeated many of the arguments made in Forsythe’s 2018 law
review article, arguing that Roe and Casey were unsettled because they were
wrong, because they had produced ongoing political polarization, and
because they involved a standard, rather than a bright-line rule.381
372
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The Court’s decision at first seemed to be a straightforward win for those
portraying Whole Woman’s Health as a valid precedent.382 The Court voted
that Louisiana’s law was unconstitutional,383 and it did not show interest in
modifying its doctrine on third-party standing.384 Most significantly, the
long-awaited conservative majority in abortion cases never appeared.385
Instead, Chief Justice Roberts joined with his more liberal colleagues in
striking down the law.386 Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion read as an ode to
precedent. 387 Understood in context, however, the role of social movement
arguments about precedent in June Medical was complex—and it will likely
continue to matter even as the Court’s composition changes.
B. June Medical’s Politics of Precedent
For the plurality, June Medical was an easy case. Justice Breyer first
addressed Louisiana’s standing argument.388 He insisted that Louisiana had
conceded that abortion providers had standing in the district court in a bid to
get a quicker ruling on the merits.389 As a result, the state could not dispute
the issue anew.390 But Breyer reasoned that, even if the state had not waived
the standing issue, stare decisis required the Court to respect the decades of
precedent on third-party standing for providers.391 He asserted that
physicians served as the “least awkward” and “most ‘obvious’” claimants
because they would be required to apply for admitting privileges or face
penalties for noncompliance.392 Stare decisis helped the majority dispense
with Louisiana’s primary argument against standing: that abortion providers
and patients had a conflict of interest.393
Breyer stressed previous cases allowing third parties to challenge the
constitutionality of laws claimed to benefit a rights holder, including in the
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393
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abortion context.
There was nothing earth-shattering about allowing
abortion providers to follow precedent and do the same again.395
The dissenting Justices’ views on standing reflected antiabortion
arguments on when a precedent truly deserved respect. Justice Thomas did
not believe that Singleton, the Court’s third-party standing ruling, deserved
deference because it was “[t]he first—and only—time” the Court had
addressed third-party standing for doctors.396 Antiabortion attorneys
considered a precedent to be shaky if a Court had often revisited or
questioned it.397 In June Medical, Justice Thomas took the opposite
position.398 Singleton did not command respect, in his view, because its
reasoning was “perfunct[ory].”399
In his own dissent, Justice Alito stood ready to do away with Singleton
because it was “unconvincing.”400 Alito insisted that the “relationship
[between providers and patients was] generally brief and very limited.”401 Nor
did Alito think that there were real obstacles for patients seeking to assert their
own rights.402 Patients seeking privacy could use a pseudonym.403 The Court
could deal with questions about mootness by leaning on the
capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exception.404 To the extent that
Singleton reflected an approach taken in other third-party cases, Alito
reasoned that other precedents were readily distinguishable: in June Medical,
there was a “glaring” conflict of interest utterly missing from other cases.405
In discussing the merits, the plurality and dissent also staked out sharply
different positions on stare decisis. The plurality found Louisiana’s law
identical in its wording and effects to the Texas law struck down in Whole
Woman’s Health.406 Justice Alito, by contrast, reasoned that the cases were
distinguishable: Whole Woman’s Health was a pre-enforcement challenge,
and June Medical was not.407 But, in any case, Justice Alito reasoned that
fidelity to precedent required the Court to get rid of Whole Woman’s Health;
in his view, Casey functionally adopted a rational basis test.408 “Many state
394
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and local laws that are justified as safety measures rest on debatable
empirical grounds,” Justice Alito wrote.409 “But when a party saddled with
such restrictions challenges them as a violation of due process, our cases call
for the restrictions to be sustained if ‘it might be thought that the particular
legislative measure was a rational way’ to serve a valid interest.”410
The dissenters also previewed future debates about whether Roe and
Casey themselves should go. Justice Thomas invoked his recent approach to
stare decisis, which would require the overturning of any “demonstrably
erroneous precedent.”411 Justice Gorsuch insisted that “Roe v. Wade [was] not
even at issue” in the case.412 Nevertheless, Justice Gorsuch foreshadowed an
argument that the consequences of Roe and Casey required both to be
overruled.413 To protect abortion rights in June Medical, Justice Gorsuch
argued, “rules must be brushed aside and shortcuts taken.”414 He listed what
he saw as perversions of doctrine governing standing, facial challenges, and
standards of review.415 His dissent echoed longstanding antiabortion
arguments that Roe should be overturned because it had distorted neutral rules
that governed any number of disputes.416 He described a strong temptation for
courts to forsake these neutral rules to achieve a specific policy outcome.417
“Today, in a highly politicized and contentious arena, we prove unwilling, or
perhaps unable, to resist that temptation,” he stated.418
But the dispute about the politics of precedent did not simply pit the
Justices who voted to strike down Louisiana’s law against those who did not.
Chief Justice Roberts’ concurrence also reflected entrenched antiabortion
arguments about what it meant to respect a precedent in the first place.419
Chief Justice Roberts certainly drew attention to his support for precedent.420
While insisting that Whole Woman’s Health was wrongly decided, he
reasoned that “[t]he Louisiana law impose[d] a burden on access to abortion
just as severe as that imposed by the Texas law, for the same reasons.”421
Stare decisis meant that Louisiana’s law could not stand.422
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But, after celebrating stare decisis at such length, Chief Justice Roberts
utterly transformed Whole Woman’s Health. For years, antiabortion lawyers
had urged the Court to pay respect to precedent while being completely free
to change substantive doctrine.423 Chief Justice Roberts took up that
invitation.424 He followed antiabortion lawyers in reasoning that almost all
balancing tests were problematic—especially in the context of abortion.425
He reasoned that, “[u]nder such tests, ‘equality of treatment is . . . impossible
to achieve; predictability is destroyed; judicial arbitrariness is facilitated;
[and] judicial courage is impaired.’”426 He felt that a balancing approach was
particularly disturbing when it came to abortion.427 “There is no plausible
sense in which anyone, let alone this Court, could objectively assign weight
to such imponderable values,” he wrote.428 Instead, the Chief Justice
considered only whether a restriction caused a substantial burden.429 Under
this test, as Chief Justice Roberts noted, the Court had invalidated only one
regulation over the course of several decades.430 As he understood it,
“legislatures [had] wide discretion to pass legislation in areas where there is
medical and scientific uncertainty.”431
Chief Justice Roberts’ concurrence was very much in the tradition of
Casey. In both cases, an opinion proclaimed fidelity to precedent and
celebrated the importance of stare decisis, while substantially changing the
meaning of that precedent Antiabortion leaders had long promoted this
approach. Rhetorical flourishes about stare decisis can send the message that
the Court is taking precedent seriously. Fidelity to precedent—or the
appearance of fidelity to past decisions of the Court—makes the Court seem
to be above the political fray. The reality, however, is that the Court’s
rhetoric of precedent has made abortion jurisprudence far less transparent.
Without transparency, stare decisis cannot deliver much benefit at all.
C. The Damage Done
Antiabortion lawyers have redefined settled law, emphasizing the
political reaction to an opinion.432 Arguments about Roe’s real-world
consequences shape antiabortion claims about reliance interests and
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433

workability. Conventionally, of course, the Court has considered changes
in the larger society as part of its stare decisis analysis, albeit in a specific and
fairly limited way.434 The Justices evaluate whether economic, social, or political
changes of any kind have undercut a precedent.435 But antiabortion lawyers have
worked to make the negative consequences of a decision an independent criterion
for reversing a precedent.436 The movement has contended that Roe should be
undone because it produced deep polarization, politicized the judicial nomination
process, and even undermined women’s health.437
The Justices seem to be listening. The most prominent example came in
the Court’s recent decision in Ramos v. Louisiana.438 Ramos involved a
longstanding Sixth Amendment problem: whether the Constitution required
a unanimous jury verdict to convict someone of a serious offense.439 Two
states, Louisiana and Oregon, permitted 10-2 jury votes to convict, relying
on an earlier Supreme Court decision in Apodaca v. Oregon.440 A splintered
Court voted to overturn Apodaca.441
Justice Brett Kavanaugh, who concurred in the decision reversing
Apodaca, made explicit his belief that the “real-world” consequences of a
decision should be an important stare decisis consideration.442 In conducting
that inquiry, Justice Kavanaugh advised the Court to consider jurisprudential
consequences “such as workability, as well as consistency and coherence
with other decisions.”443 Importantly, Justice Kavanaugh also underlined the
importance of the “real-world effects [of a precedent] on the citizenry, not
just its effects on the law and the legal system.”444
Justice Kavanaugh concluded that Apodaca had produced this kind of
negative consequence: the convictions of defendants who might otherwise
have walked free, many of whom were likely to be Black given “the racist
origins of the non-unanimous jury.”445 He also emphasized the appearance
of racism that had followed Apodaca.446 “[N]on-unanimous juries [could]
silence the voices and negate the votes of black jurors, especially in cases
433
See supra Part II. For arguments about Roe’s real-world consequences, see supra notes 157163
and accompanying text.
434
See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 85455 (1992).
435
See id. (considering “whether facts have so changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to
have robbed the old rule of significant application or justification”).
436
See supra Part I.D.
437
For arguments in favor of undoing Roe, see supra notes 141–144, 250252, 314320 and
accompanying text.
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439
Id. at 1394–95.
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Id. at 1398, 1401; Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
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with black defendants or black victims . . . .” Justice Kavanaugh viewed
Apodaca as problematic regardless of whether the racism that had inspired
the non-unanimous jury rule still persisted.448 A negative impression created
by a precedent counted against it.449 One wonders how far that holding
would extend. Would it be enough if people believed that Roe caused
polarization, even if they were mistaken?
What Justice Kavanaugh made explicit in Ramos has been implicit in
other recent Supreme Court decisions. In Janus v. American Federation of
State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31,450 Justice Alito
worked the practical harm he thought was done by an earlier precedent,
Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,451 into his analysis.452 Janus dealt with
the fees that labor unions collected from non-members.453 In Abood, the
Court had held that, under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment,
unions could not put those fees toward political advocacy but could direct
them to collective bargaining that might raise the wages of all employees.454
The Court generally considers whether time has worn away “the factual
underpinnings” of an opinion—the predicate for a precedent’s legal
conclusions.455 In Janus, Justice Alito addressed the underpinnings of Abood,
specifically the idea that public-sector unions required a closed shop to thrive.456
But his analysis went considerably further. He painted a bleak picture of the
unionized world that Abood had nourished, a world defined by “the
mounting costs of public-employee wages, benefits, and pensions,” “multiple
municipal bankruptcies,” polarized “political debate,” and “[u]nsustainable
collective-bargaining agreements.”457 He suggested that Abood should be
overturned partly because of the societal damage it had done.458
There is good reason to hesitate before making the real-world
consequences of a judicial decision a part of the Court’s approach to stare
decisis. First, there is no principled way to determine whether a particular
social, economic, or political consequence is good or bad. In Ramos, Justice
447
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Kavanaugh cited Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka as an example
of a decision that properly accounted for practical consequences.460 But,
Brown is perhaps the most canonical of the Court’s cases.461 No reasonable
jurist would suggest that de jure segregation was wise or desirable.
But most contemporary cases raise much thornier questions. Some may
see the “unsustainable” bargaining agreements derided by Justice Alito as
one of the last vestiges of a valuable (if seriously weakened) labor
movement. If more women join the workforce, is that development good or
bad? What about laws that result in fewer gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender,
or queer employees working for religious employers? It is hard to see how
the Court could characterize any such outcome as negative without taking a
sharply partisan stance.
Even if the Court could objectively identify negative consequences, the
Justices have a poor track record of understanding the precise causal role
played by a decision. Casey provides a potent example of these problems.
The plurality saved Roe partly because of its positive social, political, and
economic consequences.462 “The ability of women to participate equally in
the economic and social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability
to control their reproductive lives[,]” Casey noted, citing political scientist
and prominent feminist Rosalind Petchesky.463 It is concerning for the Court
to base so much on a fact that admittedly could not “be exactly measured.”464
Without any historical or empirical evidence, there is no reason the Court
will get it right when measuring the consequences of a decision. But, while
the field is still very much fluid, subsequent research suggests that the
legalization of abortion has enabled more women to join the workforce or
achieve better educational outcomes.465
To a more significant extent, Justice Antonin Scalia’s Casey dissent
showcases the problems with considering the practical consequences of a
decision. Scalia blamed Roe for the dysfunction of presidential politics and
Supreme Court nominations, as well as for the polarization of both the
abortion debate and politics in the United States.466 But the conflict was
extremely polarized well before Roe. When reformers focused on a
459
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compromise bill created by the American Law Institute, a measure allowing
abortion only in cases of fetal disability, rape, incest, or health threats, the
antiabortion movement rejected it outright.467 And some of the polarization
Justice Scalia attributed to Roe came from developments well after the
decision, including political-party realignment on abortion, a spread of
arguments questioning medical consensus about the effects of abortion, and
a growing distrust of scientific authorities and the media.468
But, even if courts were better at analyzing historic causation, the very
idea that the Court can settle a cultural divide is nonsensical. It is certainly
true that Roe has failed to settle the abortion debate. It is also fair to say that
Griswold v. Connecticut469 and Eisenstadt v. Baird470 failed to settle debate
about contraception—or that Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.471 failed
to settle fights about religious liberty and the contraceptive mandate of the
Affordable Care Act. If the Court overruled Roe and Casey, no sane person
would expect the abortion debate to magically disappear. It seems to be
wildly unreasonable to expect any judicial decision to settle a longstanding
political conflict. This is especially true when polarization intensifies and
diminishes for reasons having nothing to do with the Court.
Requiring a valid precedent to settle a dispute leads only to confusion and
obfuscation. The same is true of the Court’s recent tendency to conflate
various stare decisis factors. Abortion foes have made this kind of conflation
a central tactic. The more different stare decisis factors bleed into one another,
the easier it may be for the Court to justify departing from precedent.
D. Collapsing Several Factors into One
As part of the social-movement debate about precedent, antiabortion
lawyers have snuck analysis of a decision’s consequences and political
reception into the discussion of reliance or workability. Several Justices have
seemed interested in a similar gambit. Justice Thomas has openly called for
the rejection of any “demonstrably erroneous” precedent, stare decisis
467
See, e.g., GENE M. BURNS, THE MORAL VETO: FRAMING CONTRACEPTION, ABORTION, AND
CULTURAL PLURALISM IN THE UNITED STATES 227–335 (2005) (explaining that “discussion of the
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Siegel, Before (and After) Roe v. Wade: New Questions About Backlash, 120 YALE L.J. 2028, 2046–47
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472

notwithstanding.
To date, no other Justice has signed on to Justice
Thomas’s approach. At times, however, the Court has increasingly conflated
the quality of a decision’s reasoning with its workability, the polarization it
produced, and the reliance interests it created.
Consider how the Court blended these issues together in Janus, which
held that Abood was unworkable because the line between “chargeable and
nonchargeable union expenditures ha[d] proved to be impossible to draw with
precision.”473 As Janus framed it, the fact that judges interpreted Abood
differently meant that it could not be workable.474 Inconsistent interpretations
of Abood also suggested that no one could reasonably rely on it.475
But, there is nothing inherently suspicious about a decision that
produces inconsistent interpretations. Many bridle at decisions that claim to
settle sweeping constitutional questions in one fell swoop.476 Critics of Roe
suggest that the decision would have produced less controversy had the
Court proceeded more gradually.477 But a more incremental approach would
have left considerable room for interpretation by the lower courts. Cass
Sunstein, for example, proposes a decision invalidating a law that banned
abortion in cases of rape or incest.478 But what would such a decision mean
for most abortion restrictions? If lower courts cannot be sure of the answer,
does that mean that this narrow decision is necessarily unworkable?
Lower courts also often produce conflicting interpretations of
fact-intensive balancing approaches like the one announced in Casey.
Balancing tests make particular sense when there are important values on
either side of a dispute. For example, in the context of voting, the Court in
Crawford v. Marion County Election Board balanced the right to vote and
the government’s important interest in “the integrity and reliability of the
electoral process itself.”479 The stakes of voting and abortion cases are high.
Balancing approaches acknowledge that those on either side of a dispute
have legitimate, deeply held beliefs. But, balancing approaches like the ones
in Casey and Crawford almost inevitably produce inconsistent results. The
472
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parties will necessarily contest the facts, and trial judges will grapple with
different records and perhaps react differently to the same evidence. And
lower courts may disagree about the relative weight of important interests
like election integrity and the franchise. This inconsistency is to be expected
when the courts seek to move incrementally, especially when an issue is
deeply divisive. And yet, Janus positioned inconsistent interpretations of
Abood as proof that the decision was both erroneous and unworkable.480 This
understanding of workability would push the courts into maximalist
decision-making that would denigrate the beliefs of some and likely increase
the controversy surrounding an issue.
Janus also conflated the workability and persuasiveness of Abood with
the ongoing controversy surrounding union dues.481 The Court suggested
that Abood was likely wrong because controversy about its holding had
raged on since the decision came down.482 If Abood had failed to settle
disputes about union dues, then no one could reasonably rely on the Court
retaining it.483 “[P]ublic-sector unions have been on notice for years
regarding this Court’s misgivings about Abood,” Justice Alito concluded.484
The Court similarly blurred the lines between reliance, workability, and
political consequences in South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc.,485 which dealt with
timing issues related to out-of-state sellers who had to collect and remit sales
taxes.486 In an earlier case, Quill Corporation v. North Dakota,487 the Court had
held that sellers would have to pay sales tax in a state only if they had a physical
presence in the jurisdiction beyond shipping goods to that location. Much of
Wayfair centered on the negative economic consequences that Quill had
produced.488 “[T]he Internet revolution has made its earlier error all the more
egregious and harmful,” Justice Kennedy wrote of Quill.489 The fact that
Quill had not settled the issue—and that states continued to ignore or
challenge it—suggested that it was unworkable.490 Wayfair also mixed up
reliance and workability, suggesting that no one could rely on a rule that
produced inconsistent interpretations.491 “The physical presence rule as defined
by Quill is no longer a clear or easily applicable standard, so arguments for
reliance based on its clarity are misplaced,” Kennedy reasoned.492
480
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There are sound reasons for the Court to cast off the influence of
social-movement debate about precedent and analyze each stare decisis
factor on its own merits. To begin, courts are not particularly good at
determining whether a given issue is especially polarized (or the extent to
which that polarization stems from a precedent).493 If a take on reliance
interests or workability boils down to a wrong-headed point about a
decision’s practical effects, the Court’s analysis will be that much poorer for
it. As important, reliance interests and workability address different
dimensions of stare decisis. Workability worries kick in when a precedent is
incoherent or disconnected from the goals a rule is supposed to serve.
Reliance interests, by contrast, have little to do with the administrability of
a rule. Instead, reliance centers on whether a class will suffer harm if a
precedent disappears or whether a precedent has become part of our national
culture. Conflating these independent concepts increases the risk that the
Court will ignore some or all of the values that stare decisis serves.
E. The Rhetoric of Precedent
At times, as in June Medical, the Court has not announced that it is
overturning a precedent, much less explained why stare decisis dictates such
a result. The Court may modify or even partially overturn a past decision
while praising the idea of stare decisis.494 Lay readers impressed by the
Court’s apparent commitment to precedent learn, if they dig deeper, that the
Court has rewritten or partially overruled an earlier decision.
Treating respect for precedent as a rhetorical exercise undermines the
values that stare decisis is supposed to serve. Respect for precedent is supposed
to ensure predictability, consistency, and clarity. But for the Court to deliver on
any of the promises tied to stare decisis, some degree of transparency is required.
After June Medical, for example, reports initially framed the decision as a major
victory for both stare decisis and abortion rights.495
Stare decisis has also helped to legitimize the Court. No court decision
is self-executing. Indeed, there are historical examples, as in the case of
493
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school prayer, of third parties ignoring a decision at its inception and
continuing to do so years later.496 Adherence to stare decisis makes the Court
appear more legitimate, less partisan, and more committed to neutral,
principled decision-making. Indeed, as Lawrence Friedman has shown,
crises of legitimacy have plagued the Court before, especially prior to the
development of stare decisis doctrine.497
Stare decisis confers legitimacy by suggesting that the Court take the
law and its own decisions seriously, regardless of any surrounding political
dispute.498 A freestanding rhetoric of precedent—especially one that has
nothing to do with substantive respect for the Court’s past decisions—raises
serious questions about judicial legitimacy. Burying what has happened to a
precedent while singing the praises of stare decisis allows the Court to
demand legitimacy without adhering to any neutral or principled rules.
Contrary to what the antiabortion movement may otherwise suggest, the
Court rarely settles deep social divides. Transparency takes on even more
importance for this reason. The Court is but one participant in broader
dialogues about everything from abortion to voting to the size of the
administrative state. The Justices play a legitimate role in the system only
when their decisions enable, rather than undermine, the ability of other
actors, including elected officials, social movements, and administrative
agencies, to respond. This is especially true as the Court becomes
increasingly counter-majoritarian. While Democrats have won the popular
vote in the last seven presidential elections, that party has not put a majority
on the Supreme Court since 1969.499 The Court’s legitimacy has depended
on its ability to appear above the political fray.500 The Court appears likely
to be more partisan and to be perceived as such by the public.501 This
perception, in turn, will make it difficult for the Court to convince anyone
of its neutrality. The task will become all the more impossible if the Court’s
approach to key precedents, including Roe and its progeny, smacks of
cynicism and evasion. Stare decisis requires transparency to foster popular
constitutional dialogue. June Medical signals that, when it comes to
transparency, the Court is on the wrong path.
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CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in June Medical—together with the
debates surrounding the nomination of Amy Coney Barrett—deliver a powerful
reminder that social-movement politics have often centered on the meaning of
precedent. Precedent has produced heated movement-countermovement
conflict about how, when, and why the Court should defer to its own past
decisions. Central to these debates have been strategies that allow movements
themselves to manufacture proof that a precedent should be reconsidered.
The politics of precedent promise the Justices a way to dismantle a right
to abortion with fewer potential pragmatic consequences. After all, if few in
the public understand what the Court has done, any backlash to the Justices’
actions will necessarily be muted. In the abortion conflict, social movements
have offered the Court what seems to be a way to overturn Roe and avoid
(or at least manage) backlash. The Justices should resist the temptation to
follow that path. The Court has certainly contributed to constitutional
dialogue about abortion, but others have also helped to determine the scope
of abortion rights, from elected officials to social movement advocates to
physicians charged with interpreting state laws in their clinics. The Justices
are students of history, and history plainly instructs that popular
constitutional engagement with the abortion issue has been lasting and
profound. Whatever the Court does with Roe should acknowledge this
reality—and facilitate a popular conversation about abortion rights that is
almost certain to continue.

